THE SITE DEDICATED TO THE HUMAN FACTOR IN AVIATION


"…about 80% of all transportation accidents involve human error." ICAO Human Factors Digest No.4. Circular 229-AN/137 A55.

"When you get it right
Mighty beasts float up into the sky.
When you get it wrong people die. "

Roger Bacon (c1384)

'Human factors' is the International Civil Aviation Authority's answer to challenges in safety.


Systems Safety and Human Factors


Historically, safety in the aviation system was sought through enhanced systems, equipment design and certification procedures. A technological plateau was achieved in the 1970s yet incidents and accidents continued to happen. This directed the attention of the international community to the human component. The influence of human capabilities and in particular limitations in safety of operations has been evident for many years. However, little attention or interest has been directed to them.

Deficiencies in human performance have an impact in aviation incidents and accidents; "some three out of four accidents have resulted from less than optimum human performance. This has commonly been classified as "pilot error" 1. However, two points are to be made about 'pilot error'. 1. On investigation 'pilot error' is no such thing, rather the pilot has been the last person involved in what is in actuality an 'organizational accident'. 2. The term 'pilot error' is of no help in accident prevention.2 3. Some 'investigations' exclude the management and organizational factors that are part of the causal chain.

"The purpose of investigating human factors is to identify why actions lead to the breakdown in defences and result in accidents. This requires determining the related latent failures present at all levels of the organizations, including the upper levels of management, and of the aviation system of which it is a part. It goes without saying that it is equally important to determine how these unsafe actions could have been prevented. We cannot prevent humans from making errors, but we can reduce the frequency of these errors and limit their consequences. This is the essence of prevention activities and highlights the importance of investigation and reporting of incidents."3

The sources of some of these errors "may be traced to poor … procedure design or to inadequate training or operating instructions. But whatever the origin, the question of human performance capabilities and limitations and human behaviour is central to the technology of Human Factors. The cost, both in human and financial terms, of less than optimum human performance has become so great that a makeshift or intuitive approach to Human Factors is no longer appropriate. Safety being the ultimate objective of all those involved in aviation, its logical follow up is to ensure a proper level of Human Factors knowledge throughout the industry."4 This is not a requirement at present.

Well-founded evidence suggests that only by proper consideration of the way humans behave, as well as to the capabilities and limitations inherently built into the human beings, safety in aviation can be improved. We refer here to all the humans involved in the operation of aircraft, not only to flight crews. One means of tracing these is to evaluate air accident/incident reports which now have a sections for 'Management and Organizational Factors.' This is the purpose of Human Factors, which is multi-disciplinary by nature and practical in orientation. It draws from the knowledge of psychology, physiology, anthropometry, biology, as well as from the engineering sciences. Human Factors in aviation aims to contribute to achieve the aviation system goals of safe and efficient transportation of passengers. (ICAO) As a science-based discipline human factors may be an excellent one on which to develop Evidence-Based Practice.

A brief summary of the key concepts in Human Factors follows:

Human Factors is about:

In aviation, Human Factors involves, for optimal aircraft operations:

Human factors is concerned to:

This following definition was adopted by the International Ergonomics Association in August 2000:

"Ergonomics (or human factors) is the scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of interactions among humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that applies theory, principles, data, and other methods to design in order to optimize human well-being and overall system performance."

In a circular to the aviation community ICAO stated:

"The investigation of major catastrophes in large scale, high technology systems has revealed these accidents to have been caused by a combination of many factors, whose origins could be found in the lack of Human Factor considerations during the design and operating stages of the system rather than in operational personnel error. Examples of such catastrophes include the accidents at the Three Mile Island (Pennsylvania, USA, 28 March 1979) and Chernobyl (Ukraine, USSR 26 April 1986) nuclear power plants, the Challenger space shuttle (Florida, USA 28 January 1986), the double B-747 Disaster at Tenerife (Canary Island, Spain, 27 March 1977) and Bhopal (Bhopal, India 3 December 1984) chemical plant. Large scale, high-technology systems like nuclear power generation and aviation have been called sociotechnical system, in reference to the complex interactions between their human and technological components. Management factors and organisational accidents are key concepts in the sociotechnical systems safety. The terms system accident and organisational accident reflect the fact that certain inherent characteristics of the sociotechnical system, such as their complexity and the unexpected interaction of multiple failures, will inevitably produce an accident. In sociotechnical system, remedial action based on safety findings goes beyond those who had the last opportunity to prevent the accident, ie the operational personnel, to include the influence of the designer and managers, as well as the structure or architecture of the system. In this approach, the objective is to find what, rather than who, is wrong."

As the circular observes, the phenomenon is not confined to aviation. But the characteristics of aviation make it particularly vulnerable because of the nature of modern aviation and the projected doubling of the volume of aircraft movements over the next two decades.6 It brings to the fore the results of failure to learn, (a key feature of the 'toxic' organization.) Later disasters may have been averted had the lessons of Erebus been acted on. A Justice who was a barrister who worked on the Erebus case says, "The lesson is that inaction can be disastrous" and states that the lesson is to:

As it is important to determine how these unsafe actions could have been prevented it follows that decision-making in high-risk systems should be applied proactively, not reactively. This means that aviation managers should look at 'what' and 'where' rather than 'who' is wrong, and adjust their systems accordingly, that is, identify and accept responsibility. From the psychodynamic perspective where 'who is wrong' governs management practices the organization will fail to learn 'what is wrong' and there will be a possibility that they will scapegoat those who they perceive to be in the wrong. Such 'troublemakers' will then be ejected. The second part of the 'lesson that inaction can be disastrous' will then not be witnessed by those with the knowledge-base to prevent future accidents. This is ineffective management.

In investigation of the management factors in accidents it has been noted that "Effective accident prevention can be linked inalterably to effective management."8 However, the efforts to persuade managers to be actively involved in safety were 'government management corrective efforts.' (p3) ie an effort that is reactive not proactive. "It has been suggested that perhaps not enough airline executives have had the benefit of command or advanced safety management training" (in 1991). This leaves modern airline executives pursuing the business benefits of their airlines without knowledge of the safety systems needed to support it. In their minds profits may come first. Safety decision-making, it is reasoned, will be influenced by this dynamic.

Aviation has been undergoing major change in the last decade. Psychologists who specialise in organizational change and human behaviour note that ineffective leadership can resort to very primitive and basic behaviour in order to attempt to hold an organization together. In such circumstances it is not unusual to see evidence of "ongoing disarray, conflict, resentment, and … ineffectual performance." An example is offered of a manager who, as he was confronted with his inability to control the organization became more bullying and abusive:-

"He became increasingly enraged, exhorting people to change and resorting to threats and tantrums."

Here, the very leaders may find that they are in effect producing

"a highly punitive environment of suspicion, persecutory anxiety, and contemptuous sabotage."9

So, unconscious motivating factors in the leadership of organizations may not be in keeping the values described in Human Factors literature, that of a humane system that optimizes the relationship between people and their activities by the systematic application of human sciences which is integrated within the framework of systems engineering. ie human well-being.

What unconscious motivating factors could account for the paradox of an airline manager succumbing to contemptuous sabotage? The frightful truth is that aircraft can kill people; flying is dangerous, and the fact that aircraft captains can be in charge of lives may result in protective demeanours to counter primitive fears (of loss of life). These processes may be entirely unconscious.

Another possibility is that the original dual mandate has its echoes further downsptream. The divide between managers and pilots (commerce and safety) is demonstrating a 'split'. Psychologically a split is a process by which a mental structure "loses its integrity and becomes replaced by two or more part-structures." This can be seen in many airlines, where flight crew and cabin crew report to different parts of the organization yet are encouraged to work as a unit inside an aircraft in flight. In 'splitting' "the emotional attitude towards the two part-structures is typically antithetical, one object being experienced as 'Good' …. the other as 'Bad'" 10 If this attitude becomes part of corporate culture it could lead to aircrew being viewed as 'bad' by managers and being scapegoated, probably for reasons that they themselves may not understand.

An outworking of this dynamic was noted by a Captain Andy Yates who said that flight attendants failed to comply with direct orders from the captain and sometimes (in his experience) "deliberately disobeyed" orders. His interpretation of their motives ... because flight deck crews were organizationally separated from flight attendants, the former reporting in flight operations and the latter to a marketing or passenger service decision. Capt. Yates considered the separation to be a major factor in some flight attendants' perception that the captain was peripheral in their chain of command.11 The dangers in this failing are acknowledged. While this was described in 1992 there is evidence that the situation is getting worse in some UK carriers.

Safety is about the identification and remediation of latent threats before they have adverse consequences. 12 This leaves the task of evaluating how they create less than safe situations. This is being explored in this site

Error management. Boeing advocates the use the Procedural Event Analysis Tool (PEAT), for which training began in 1999. It is used to "effectively manage the risks associated with flight crew procedural deviations." If a risk-management process is applied, "PEAT assumes that there are reasons why the flight crew member failed to follow a procedure or made an error and that the error was not intentional. Based on this assumption, a trained investigator interviews the flight crew to collect detailed information about the procedural deviation and the contributing factors associated with it. This detailed information is then entered into a database for further analysis. PEAT is the first industry tool to focus on procedurally related incident investigations in a consistent and structured manner so that effective remedies can be developed.13 Delta-Tripod "focuses on the organizational and human factors affecting safe working practices. It is bottom-up in its operation. …. it tells how the world actually is, rather than how it ought to be…" and "is deliberately non-comprehensive. It samples a limited number of possible dimension of safety health."14 All of these provide a consistent approach to error management.

The lack of systematic organization exposed in this synopsis allows the 'system' to be 'full of holes'. The decision to prosecute Captain Stewart when he 'fell into one of the holes', opened the way to making pilots "face court action for mistakes." Who decides whether a 'mistake' is culpable within an organization? Management who have the power to deny and cover-up their own mistakes! At the time of Captain Stewart's trial the prosecutors, the CAA, were accused of malice - acting "out of spite."15 Again, the message learned from an early aviation accident in Antarctica was lost. Again, to this day, we are looking at who is wrong rather than what is wrong. The system has remained unchanged in some places. The lack of focus, described by the Science and Technology Committee, will ensure that no official body will look at these issues with a view to changing them; no-one in the DETR is likely to be charged with this task. The knowledge-base for such decision-making has probably been lost.

Key to any safety system is the ability of organizations to communicate. Ineffective communication has been cited as causal factor in crashes. The communication problems noted in this Synopsis fall directly into the category cited by Professor James Reason, that of, "system failures in which the necessary channels of communication do not exist, or are not functioning, or are not regularly used." 16 This may be an expression of the 'contemptuous sabotage' described by Kranz. It is certainly well below the standards required of the management of Human Factors. In the case that follows a Tribunal criticizes an airline for this failing. However, this observation is taken no further in terms of systems safety.

In this synopsis an important teaching about pilot safety is relevant. Information processing (outside the conscious control) failed the pilots at Erebus who physiologically could not see a mountain because of 'whiteout'. It is now obvious to say that "Before a person can react to information, it must first be sensed; there is a potential for error here, because the sensory systems function only within a narrow range. Once information is sensed, it makes its way to the brain, where it is processed, and a conclusion is drawn about the nature and meaning of the message received. This interpretative activity is called perception and is a breeding ground for errors. Expectation, experience, attitude, motivation and arousal all have a definite influence on perception and are possible sources of errors.17 This is key to deciding culpability in this and other cases.

There are UK obligations to ICAO to have "a formal incident reporting system to facilitate collection of information on actual or potential safety deficiencies."18

Profits over safety?


The profits over safety arguments are a continuing theme in aviation and reflect the dual mandate so criticized by Mary Schiavo. In the US19 and UK 20 writers call for changes. The Transport sub-Committee 1999 received submissions from the Aviation Study Group (ASG) at Linacre College, Oxford, from Cranfield University and BALPA. All called for a Regulator that was devoid of 'interest'. Some of the points that were made include:

The Times made the point that, "Both the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and the House Commons Select Committee on Transport have voiced concerns over this close relationship between industry provider and regulator, and this was even highlighted by the CAA's Chairman Christopher Chataway in 1994 when he commented that "…the CAA in the UK finds itself in the position of regulating itself and its own competitors..."21 Is the CAA's political survivability dependent on this dynamic?

Economics and safety regulation was again criticized in relation to NATS when the Select Committee recommended that "safety regulation should be transferred to a body completely separate from the CAA…" but the Secretary of State for Transport had, in his response, not accepted that safety regulation should be transferred, stating that the government "keeps an open mind" on the subject of economic regulation." The article continues, "…the Government has seen fit to ignore all advice except that proffered by the CAA itself." This in itself lacks integrity. The system is therefore operated on the basis of the integrity of individual managers and the integrity of various unions - both groups were criticized by the Science and Technology Committee for their lack of attention to aircrew health.

Further to this the Warsaw and Chicago Conventions privilege airlines to limit their liability. The power and the strength (and therefore culpability?) lies with the airlines. The travelling public have little access to justice other than to litigate. Workers within the industry have similar problems as industrial relations seem, increasingly, to be played out in courts of law rather than in a transparent and organized safety system. Here we see that the proactive system advocated by ICAO has been reduced to a reactive and litigious one.

Organizationally, given the proven links between management factors and accidents responsible airlines have taken the advice of ICAO and implemented safety management systems. (SMSs) These take a 'systems perspective' and through a series of overlapping defences, seek to obviate potential accidents and incidents. The human factors element of such a system advocates a 'no blame' culture. Only then can pilots feel free to raise safety concerns and admit where there may be 'failures' and the system can be upgraded accordingly. With the old system of blaming pilots none would speak up for fear of reprisal and latent errors remained in the system until the inevitable constellation of events - fatigue, inclement weather, pushing the limits, would bring the inevitable disaster. The dual mandate now demonstrates itself in a 'profits versus safety dichotomy' which, for safety, relies only on the integrity of the individual manager.

The only recourse that pilots have when they consider that safety is critical is Whistleblowing. Legislation allows employees to make protected disclosures within their companies. This may not be completely successful.

Fundamentals. When the international nature of the developing airline industry was formally recognised by the establishment of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in the 1940s, the organisation's fundamental purpose was to ensure that the development of commercial aviation proceeded in a safe and orderly manner.22 It helped to create 'a level playing field' among the nations. Aviation is chiefly a commercial activity and the Air Commerce Act promoted the development and stability of commercial efforts. The FAA in the US helped to develop commercial aviation. However, the regulation of safety was becoming an increasing need on both sides of the Atlantic. In 1926 the aviation industry in the US pressed Congress to set safety standards. Congress declared in the Federal Aviation Act that the FAA's purpose was to "…provide for the regulation and promotion of civil aviation…" This changed the dynamics into a dual mission; those of commercial development and of safety.

Mary Schiavo, former Inspector General of the US Department of Transportation (Aviation) notes, "The FAA's dual mission did not leap out an anyone in 1958 - or in most of the years following - as a glaring paradox because, "At its core safety isn't cost effective" She noted, "The first priority is to promote the business of aviation." However, in those days, aviation was heavily regulated…the aviation industry thrived under the care and nurturing of the government." 23

In the UK the CAA provided the same function as the FAA and the business of aviation, privileged through Conventions that limited their liabilities, flourished. She adds, "with deregulation in 1978, the industry was free to take advantage of all that technology, competition and huge numbers of new passengers …. But there were unforeseen downsides, such as destructive competition." And the FAA "simply could not keep up." This is the context within which aircrew find themselves today in the UK and no one person is monitoring this downside. The term 'economic regulation' is an oxymoron.

For pilots this subtle shift of emphasis from safety to the development of commercial aviation, along with government endorsement and de-regulation, is I assert, the root cause of major difficulties for pilot health and for their safety. While commerce has a voice at high level, pilots do not. Managers are, on the whole, not trained in aviation safety; pilots are. This sets the scene for the conflict between the two groups as I hope this synopsis demonstrates - airline managers reflect the dual mission by using 'double-bind management' for the implementation of 'dangerous decisions'. For an in-depth examination of this dynamic see Professor Mumford on 'The Double-Bind Manager' set in high-risk systems. 24 In ten years five pilots have died at one UK regional airline in fatal crashes. Another has been incapacitated during a flight - there had been no prior risk-assessment or adherence to COSHH regulations prior to the accident. There is no case of 'pilot error'. No management factors were taken into account. No-one has been held accountable. The pilot is now disabled. Another pilot died in a fatal crash at this airline a few months later.

management factors can lead to accidents and incidents. It also has the advantage that the pilot, while disabled, is still alive and can talk about the issues that endangered his life and the lives of his passengers. Yet two years after this accident no-one is listening; no one person in government is monitoring this, the downside.

Political framework - "a recipe for inaction." The UK has obligations to ICAO under the Chicago Convention Annex 13 Chapter 7.3 to produce a reporting system for facilitate collection of information on actual or potential safety deficiencies. On the subject of departures from international standards and procedures, Article 38 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation states:

"Any State which finds it impracticable to comply in all respects with any such international standard or procedure, or to bring its own regulations or practices into full accord with any international standard to procedure after amendment of the latter, or which deems it necessary to adopt … practices differing in any particular respect from those established by an international standard, shall give immediate notification to the International Civil Aviation Organization of the differences between its own practice and that established by the international standard." 25

Thus it is important to examine the political framework within which aviation is developed and managed, and whether actual or potential safety deficiencies are reported to ICAO.

Further legislation followed; "The UK as a Contracting State of ICAO, is required to take the necessary measures to achieve compliance with the ICAO Technical Instructions. It should also be noted that airline operators also require compliance with their own IATA 'Dangerous Goods Regulations.'" 26 This is, of course, the remit of the Secretary of State for Transport. His role in this case is noted p.x.(letter Sec of State

In 2000 The House of Lords Science and Technology Committee illustrated an aviation system that fails aircrew through lack of attention - by regulators, airlines and aircrew trade unions. (1.11) "Our concern is not that health is secondary to safety but that it has been woefully neglected." 27

"The lead on aviation health is, in our view, unacceptably weak. However, even in relation to safety - the main purpose of present national and international regulatory structures - the centre of gravity is not obvious. A full range of safety rules and regulations is in place under ICAO, but changing them seems remarkably difficult. Although ICAO has the authority, the reality is that it is governed by its member States. For things to progress in ICAO, members not only have to promote them strongly from below, but they may also have to deal laterally with regional organisations like JAA and the European Union at the same time (QQ 3-6, 71 & 72). This is a recipe for inaction: as an organisation, ICAO can wait for Member States' initiatives; and member States can wait for ICAO's lead. JAA is in a similar position (QQ 347 & 378). We recommend the United Kingdom and other governments to do everything they can to reduce inertia within the international safety-focused regulatory structures." 28

Ministers may collude with 'pilot error' verdicts erroneously, putting further errors into the system. 29

Lack of accountability is increasingly seen to be a safety deficit, "…there is significant public dissatisfaction in Scotland with the lack of prosecution against individuals. There is a strong groundswell of public and stakeholder opinion in favour of a new offence specifically for individual directors/managers whose actions or omissions were a significant factor in the death of an employee or member of the public." 30 Amnesty International say, "More than 300 MPs have expressed their support for more comprehensive laws promoting better corporate accountability. The weight of opinion in Britain, Europe and around the world suggests governments must act. People are concerned by the growing social and environmental impacts corporate activities have on their lives. The Government must recognise this." It notes, "There is also growing support from members of the business community for mandatory regulation in this area so that a 'level playing-field' can be created - meaning companies who take corporate social responsibility seriously would not have to compete with 'free-riders' in their industries who do not." 31

1-3 The House of Lords Science and Technology Select committee Fifth Report (2000) on Aviation Health. Where deficits in decision-making exist regarding pilot health and safety the travelling public will also have cause to be concerned about their own health and safety. While this link was not made explicitly by The House of Lords Science and Technology Select committee the industry was criticized therein for its attitudes to both aircrew and passenger health. The two are inextricably linked. This committee have reserved some of their most critical remarks for the aviation industry. 32 Some of their statements supply insight into how aircrew (and passengers) are being failed by airlines, regulators and unions:-

Outside aviation the UK's Health and Safety Commission claims of a move to "sensible controls sensibly applied" and "evidence-based" policy making (Hazards 86), have taken a serious knock as three reports show the UK has fallen out of the world's safety elite and has adopted a dangerous and poorly argued policy platform. 35 The UK is slipping down the world safety rankings and is now outside Europe's top 10. "a slew of new reports raise urgent warning signs about current government safety policies. High on the list of critical evidence is a new International Labour Office world ranking, which puts the UK 21st out of 23 developed nations in its 'work security index' rating of health and safety performance." What inferences can be drawn about the more secretive aviation system?

In 2002 pilots globally demonstrated concern at heavy-handed tactics towards pilots who raise safety concerns. The Oneworld Cockpit Crew Coalition asked 'how long will Oneworld Alliance airlines keep beating up on employees.' The adverts say pilots 'are concerned about the trend we see developing among the member carriers of intimidating employees who raise safety and security concerns.' The British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA) commented: 'We are all concerned about the heavy handed tactics of some Oneworld airlines towards pilots who raise safety and security concerns. We are therefore asking every Oneworld carrier to recommit to safety, protecting passengers and crew and treating employees with respect.' 36 The airline discussed in a case of pilot incapacitation is an affiliate member of Oneworld.

  1. CAP 719 Fundamental Human Factors Concepts (previously ICAO Digest No. 1) Chapter 1 This document was previously published by ICAO as Circular number 21
  2. CAP 719 Fundamental Human Factors Concept1.2
  3. ICAO Human Factors Digest No.7.
  4. CAP 719 Fundamental Human Factors Concepts (previously ICAO Digest No. 1) Chapter 2 1.2 This document was previously published by ICAO as Circular number 21
  5. Professor Edwards. ICAO Circular 216-AN/131.1.10
  6. Kotaite. A. July 2000 Aviation Study Group, Linacre College, Oxford
  7. Baragwanath. D. Hon. in NGAKIA KIA PUAWAI Keynote Addresses to the Police Management Development Conference
    8-10 November 2005, Nelson (The echo of Wilsons & Clyde Coal Ltd v English [1938] AC 57 is intentional. That case set out the obligations of an employer with the opportunity and responsibility to plan and undertake safe systems of work. The decision turns on the employer's authority and access to resources. The moral obligation of those of us in public authority to do the same is in principle no different.
  8. Miller, C.O. (1991) Investigating the Management Factors in an Airline Accident. Flight Safety Foundation. Flight Safety Digest May 1991
  9. Kranz, James 2001 Ch.6 Dilemmas of Organizational Change: A systems Psychodynamic Perspective.p149-150 in The Systems Psychodynamics of Organizations. Ed. Laurence Gould, Lionel F. Stapley, and Mark Stein. Karnac)
  10. Rycroft, Charles. (1968) Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis. Penguin
  11. Edwards, Mary. (1992) Crew Coordination Problems Persist, Demand new training challenges. Cabin Crew Safety Vol.27 No.6. Flight Safety Foundation
  12. Helmreich R 2001:14
  13. http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_08/human_textonly.html#error
  14. Reason. James (1997) Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Ashgate p138
  15. Harvey, Elliott. Malice denied in pilot case. The Times 2 May 1991
  16. Reason. James (1997) Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Ashgate ; + others)
  17. CAP 719 Fundamental Human Factors Concepts (previously ICAO Digest No. 1) the Safety Regulation Group (1.2.1
  18. ICAO States International Obligations. Chicago Convention Annex 13.Ch.7.3
  19. Schiavo, Mary. (1997) Flying Blind, Flying Safe. Avon Books. New York
  20. Weir, Andrew. (1999)The Tombstone Imperative. Pocket Books.
  21. The Times, (Jan 1996) Regulating Regulators.
  22. The House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology Fifth Report 15 November 2000 Select Committee appointed to consider Science and Technology. AIR TRAVEL AND HEALTH ? [[3.5 House of Lords etc], 8.2]
  23. Schiavo, Mary. (1997) Flying Blind, Flying Safe. Avon Books. New York.
  24. Mumford. E. (1999) Dangerous Decisions. Problem Solving in Tomorrow's World. Kluwer Academic Plenum.
  25. Convention on International Civil Aviation. Doc 7300/8 p17.
  26. Statutory Instrument. 1994 No.3187 Civil Aviation. The Air Navigation (Dangerous Goods) Regulations 1994
  27. The House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology Fifth Report 15 November 2000 Select Committee appointed to consider Science and Technology. AIR TRAVEL AND HEALTH
  28. The House of Lords Science and Technology committee Fifth Report (2000) 8.7
  29. MPs misled over Chinook. Collins Tony. Computer Weekly 27 May 1999 www.computerweekly.co.uk
  30. Company Executives face new offence of corporate killing. The Times. Friday November 18 2005. Angus Macleod. Scottish political Editor.
  31. http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news/press/14603.shtml
  32. The House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology Fifth Report 15 November 2000 Select Committee appointed to consider Science and Technology. AIR TRAVEL AND HEALTH
  33. Enforcement of Health and Safety on Aircraft Graeme Henderson SPDA4 2002
  34. The House of Lords Science and Technology committee Fifth Report (2000) 8.10
  35. Making safety dangerous again Hazards 88, October-December 2004
  36. Risks issue no 62 - 13 June 2002

'AIRLINES IN DISREGARD FOR PILOT HEALTH SHOCKER'

Surely not – with their reputation? The aviation industry is one of the most high profile, profitable and polluting in the world. It also appears that it may be one of the most stressful and dangerous places to work. While airline companies demand huge government bail outs to support their profitability, the safety of their own pilots seems to be less of a priority. Captain Peter Standing died of a heart attack after an incident aboard his Jumbo Jet in April 2002.

For story, go to:

Corporate Watch

Find 'AIRLINES IN DISREGARD FOR PILOT HEALTH SHOCKER.' in Newsletter 23 April/May 2005 where you can download it as a pdf file.

Archive

Past articles:

Pilot Deaths - What they don't tell you

Deadly Business

Directors' Duty Bill

Press briefing for local media in Oxford

See Also...

For more information see the articles and resources below.

In Memoriam Aircrew work-related deaths

Sticking Up For Pilots - Out Of Africa – Integrity

Honesty In Airline Shock, Horror

WORK RELATED DEATHS - a protocol for liaison (PDF)

Rationale (PDF)

Chris Standing's Biographical Introduction (PDF)

Stress guidelines (PDF)

Article: Karoshi - sick to death of management indifference? (Word doc)

Article: Death from Overwork Reaches All-time High

Article: Worked to death